Xinjiang Cotton, De Minimis Shipments, and the UFLPA Entity List: Why Shein Still Isn’t There

I. Introduction

The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, 2021 Entity List, which is kept up to date by the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force (FLETF) under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), had 144 entities on it as of November 22, 2025.[i] This was after 29 new entities were added on November 22, 2025, with the changes taking effect on November 25, 2025.[ii] According to the FLETF’s August 2025 Strategy Update, this is an increase of 78 entities in 2025 alone, from 68 at the beginning of the year.[iii] But even with this rise, Shein Group Limited, the ultra-fast-fashion giant based in Singapore with $38 billion in projected revenue for 2025, is still missing.[iv] Bloomberg News did isotopic testing in November 2025 and found Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) cotton signatures in 90% of 42 U.S.-bound garments.[v]

This omission is one of the instances of a deep legal contradiction where UFLPA Sec. 3(a) assumes that all goods linked to XUAR are not allowed under Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930. However, Shein’s dominance in de minimis shipments, 48–52% of 1.36 billion low-value parcels shipped each year under 19 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(2)(C), protects it from regular scrutiny.[vi] According to a dashboard update from August 2025, U.S. Customs and Border Protection has stopped 16,700 UFLPA shipments worth $3.7 billion.[vii] Out of which 15.8% (by value) of these shipments were textiles.[viii] However, only 1,247 shipments worth $8.7 million have been restricted since the May 2025 de minimis suspension via Executive Order no.14195.[ix] This article dissects the reasons behind Shein’s exemption under Sec.2(d)(2)(B) of ULFPA. Using the information from various sources like DHS/FLETF strategies, the CECC/House Select Committee reports (2023–2025), the ILO Report XIV (February 2025), and others, it argues for the legislative reconciliation via the Import Security and Fairness Act (H.R. 322, 119th Congress). Until then, goods that are probably illegal are flooding the market, undermining the absolute ban of § 1307.

II. Why Xinjiang Cotton Is Presumptively Inadmissible

For almost a hundred years, American law has made it illegal to bring in goods made with forced labor. The Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1307) is clear: if even one thread, button, or stitch comes from forced labor anywhere in the world, the whole product is not allowed.[x] Customs can take it, destroy it, and fine you up to the full value of the shipment. The law was passed during the Great Depression to protect American workers.[xi] Its ‘wholly or in part’ language is meant to reach far downstream; one bad input poisons the finished garment. In 2016, Congress got rid of the last way to get around the law: an old exception that let goods made with forced labor come in if there wasn’t enough of them in the US.[xii] That made the ban completely real. The UFLPA, which was enforced on June 21, 2022, made existing law even stricter.[xiii] It was like a sledgehammer aimed directly at Xinjiang. It set up a strong, simple assumption: any good mined, made, or manufactured in whole or in part in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or by any company on the ‘UFLPA Entity List’ is assumed to have been made with forced labor and cannot be accepted.[xiv] The only way to get around that presumption is to show ‘clear and convincing evidence’ that forced labor was not used at any point. In practice, this means doing a full supply chain map all the way back to the cotton field, having independent third-party audits, DNA or isotopic testing, and proof that you weren’t involved in Xinjiang’s well-known ‘poverty alleviation’ or labor-transfer programs.[xv] The assumption is not hypothetical. Xinjiang grows more than one-fifth of the world’s cotton and almost all of China’s. Reports from the International Labour Organization, satellite images, survivors’ accounts, and investigative journalism all show that the government is forcing millions of Uyghurs and other minorities to pick cotton and work in factories, often under the direct control of the paramilitary Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. It is almost impossible to avoid scientific testing. Independent labs can find Xinjiang-grown cotton with amazing accuracy using stable-isotope analysis and DNA tracing. Bloomberg bought a lot of Shein clothes in 2022 and again in 2025 and sent them for testing.[xvi] The results were disheartening: the vast majority came from Xinjiang growing regions, leaving almost no other possible origins on Earth. The UFLPA says in plain language that a Shein dress made with Xinjiang cotton is likely illegal and should never be allowed through customs.[xvii] But, as the next sections explain, legal loopholes, narrow agency interpretations, and just the sheer number of them have kept the door open until very recently.

III. UFLPA § 2(d)(2)(B): The Five Statutory Grounds for Entity List Designation

The UFLPA authorizes the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force (FLETF) to officially designate firms engaged in five particular acts associated with forced labor in Xinjiang.[xviii] After inclusion of the name of a company in the Entity List, all its goods are prohibited from being imported, except in cases where importers demonstrate otherwise.[xix] The five criteria for inclusion on the list are:[xx]

(i)         companies operating in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region;

(ii)       those partnering with the regional government to utilize Uyghurs and other minorities for coerced labor;

(iii)     international companies procuring from Xinjiang or from other identified entities;

(iv)      exporters of goods produced through forced labor; and

(v)       companies facilitating circumvention of the ban.

Every six months, the Federal Register circulates evidence for these listings, using diverse sources including internal papers, survivor accounts, and satellite imagery.[xxi] In 2025, many new companies emerged, specifically in the apparel industry. It highlighted the extensive participation of entities like Huafu Fashion and Xinjiang Tianmian, which are associated with subsections (i) and (iii).[xxii] Significantly, the e-commerce platform Shein remains unlisted despite considerable evidence connecting its supply chain to forced labor practices in Xinjiang. The FLETF enforces rigorous criteria for evidence, necessitating confirmation that a company was the exporter or was knowingly engaged with forced-labor inputs.[xxiii] This inadequate interpretation enables Shein to function without any consequences, despite objections from congresspersons who contend that Shein promotes the export of garments manufactured through forced labor. The statutory language of ULFPA is clear and strong; yet, restrictions stem from the FLETF’s conventional interpretation and institutional disinclination to classify substantial assistance as a form of exporting.[xxiv] Unless FLETF alters its approach to tackle these issues, fashion platforms like Shein will circumvent oversight.

IV. The De Minimis Exemption as a De Facto Exclusion from UFLPA Enforcement

The de minimis exemption in Section 321(a)(2)(C) of the Tariff Act of 1930 lets low-value goods enter the US with minimal customs-entry requirements, effectively limiting the enforcement of Section 307 of Tariff Act.[xxv] It was originally designed to simplify low-value imports and reduce the burden on both businesses as well as the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP).[xxvi] However, it became a major enforcement issue later.  As part of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act (Pub. L. 114-125), Congress raised the threshold from 200 USD to 800 USD, effective March 10, 2016.[xxvii] This made it even simpler for more of these shipments to come into the United States.  According to the latest data from CBP, what was once a modest flow of 139 million parcels in fiscal year 2015 has grown to over 1.36 billion in fiscal year 2024, with more than 60% coming from the People’s Republic of China.[xxviii] This sudden rise made it impossible for CBP to inspect all of these packages, so they only physically checked about 0.04% of them. This created a virtual blind spot for possible violations of forced labor laws.

Platforms like Shein and Temu took full advantage of this exemption, making up between forty-eight and fifty-two percent of all de minimis shipments entering the United States, or about six hundred thousand packages every day.[xxix] E-commerce platforms like Shein and Temu use a direct-to-consumer-based model that breaks orders into low-value packages to qualify for the de minimis exemption, allowing them to avoid duties and bypass the detailed supply-chain disclosures required under the UFLPA.[xxx] The House Select Committee on the CCP (interim report 2023 and reaffirmed in 2025) and the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC)’s ‘Corporate Complicity’ hearing warn that this system lets companies ship goods directly from Chinese suppliers with only minimal documentation, leaving CBP unable to verify whether items are linked to forced labour in Xinjiang.[xxxi] Because the UFLPA’s forced labour ban does not override the de minimis carve-out, it creates a safe space for high volume, low-value imports. The FLETF 2024 strategy update acknowledges that the original purpose of the exemption was to simplify small-value trade.[xxxii] However, now it undermines the tolerance mandate of Sec.1307 and enables what lawmakers describe as corporate complicity in human rights abuses. In response, US has suspended the de minimis for commercial shipments from China and Hong Kong, effective May 2, 2025.[xxxiii]

V. FLETF’s Interpretation of “Knowing Engagement” and “Exporting” Under § 2(d)(2)(B)(iv)–(v): Why Shein Remains Outside the List

The ULFPA gives the FLETF five different legal reasons to put an entity on the public Entity List. Subsections (iv) and (v) are the two that seem to fit Shein perfectly on paper: Section (iv) talks about companies that ‘export’ goods made with forced labor from Xinjiang or by listed companies. Section (v) talks about companies that “attempt to violate, or help others violate” the import ban.[xxxiv] More than three years after the UFLPA went into effect, Shein is still not on the list, which now has one hundred forty-four names. It’s not because there isn’t enough evidence of risk; it’s because FLETF and the Department of Homeland Security have chosen to interpret the words ‘knowing engagement’ and ‘exporting’ in a very careful way.[xxxv] FLETF has made it clear in its August 2025 Strategy Update, in every Federal Register notice adding entities, and in closed-door briefings to Congress that it will only designate a company under these two subsections when it has public, verifiable evidence that the company knowingly took part in the forced-labor supply chain.[xxxvi] That is a much higher standard than the ‘reasonable indication’ standard used for upstream producers like cotton gins, yarn spinners, and XPCC subsidiaries. FLETF requires importers, including downstream retailer, to provide clear proof to rebut the UFLPA’s presumptions that goods from high-risk sources were produced by forced labour.[xxxvii] This proof can be in the form of documents, emails, contracts, or whistle-blower testimony that show the company knew it was getting bad materials and did it anyway.

Shein has set up its business and sourcing practices in such a way that it stays on the right side of that line of evidence.[xxxviii] Shein says it sources finished garments from thousands of independent factories in China’s Guangdong and Zhejiang provinces. Although the company is headquartered in Singapore, many of its legal entities are registered in jurisdictions where disclosure of tier-2 and tier-3 suppliers isn’t required.[xxxix] As a result, Shein publicly lists only its tier-1 factories, the final cut and sew stage, while withholding information about the upstream gins, spinning mills, and yarn producers that handle cotton. When pressed by the media, the company typically responds that it doesn’t support forced labour in its supplier code of conduct and social audits. However, those audits only go as far as the factory gate and almost never go to the cotton fields or spinning mills.

This lack of clarity is not by chance. Lawyers call it ‘plausible deniability’. Shein can and does say that it had no direct contractual relationship with any Entity List spinner, that it never told anyone to use Xinjiang cotton, and that any contamination happened several tiers upstream without its knowledge, even when independent isotopic testing (Bloomberg 2022 and 2025, Oritain 2024) shows that the vast majority of Shein garments contain Xinjiang cotton signatures.[xl] Critics say that FLETF has so far accepted Shein’s self-audits’ defence as enough to keep Shein off the list because it. Another important limit is FLETF’s narrow definition of the word ‘exporting’ in subsection (iv).[xli] The task force adds a Chinese spinning mill or fabric maker because that mill physically ships yarn or greige fabric out of China. FLETF has traditionally treated the exporter as the party named on the bill of lading, the entity that directly ships the goods.[xlii] Under that view, an e-commerce platform in Singapore that merely enables a Chinese company to sell to US buyers isn’t considered the exporter of record.

Holding up and stopping shipments from just one upstream mill can throw off an entire part of the textile supply chain all at once. Adding a huge downstream company like Shein, which sends hundreds of thousands of packages every day, would be too much for CBP’s current resources and could cause a huge backlash from consumers.[xliii] The August 2025 Strategy Update is clear about this triage: the task force is “prioritizing high-impact upstream designations that remove tainted inputs at the source” while still gathering evidence on downstream actors. Congress has not been quiet. Senator Rubio, the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, and the co-chairs of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China have all asked many times that Shein be added to either subsection (iv) or (v).[xliv] Their letters all point to the same isotopic evidence, the same suppliers that are also listed (Huafu Fashion, Xinjiang Tianmian), and the same refusal to publish lists of lower-tier factories.[xlv] FLETF’s answer has been polite but vague. They say the investigation is ‘ongoing’ and that any designation must be backed up by ‘sufficient verifiable evidence’. This means that Shein is still in a strange legal limbo. The UFLPA’s geographic presumption makes it likely that its clothes are not allowed, but the company itself is not on the Entity List, which would automatically trigger that presumption. Until FLETF lowers its evidentiary threshold for downstream platforms, or until Congress amends the statute to clarify that “exporting” includes facilitating the export, Shein can continue to operate at the edge of the law, fully aware of the risk in its supply chain, yet insulated by a combination of corporate opacity, narrow statutory interpretation, and administrative pragmatism. That protection is wearing thin. If the Import Security and Fairness Act passes, every de minimis parcel would have to show who made it, which would take away a lot of Shein’s ability to deny responsibility. The task force’s narrow interpretation of ‘knowing engagement’ and ‘exporting’ remains the key reason why Shein is not listed along with 144 other names.

VI. Executive Orders 14195 & 14259 and the Pending Import Security and Fairness Act: Attempts to Close the § 1321 Loophole

For years, the de minimis exemption under Sec. 1321 lets in low-value imports in the United States of America with minimal oversight.[xlvi] It was a loophole that companies like Shein rely upon to ship cheap, single-item packages directly to consumers without any customs reviews and duties. With these platforms accounting for a huge portion of US-bound shipments from China, President Trump brought up Executive Order 14195 on February 1, 2025, declaring a national emergency tied to China’s role in the fentanyl crisis and in addition to targeting precursor chemicals, suspended de minimis duty-free treatment for goods from China and Hong Kong.[xlvii] Follow-up orders (14200 and 14256) finalised the process, and the exemption officially ended on May 2, 2025. From then on, Chinese shipments had to clear CBP’s ACE system and pay duties including a 10% ad-valorem rate while postal items fee increased by 50 USD per package in June 2025[xlviii]. The impact on Shein and Temu proved to be immediate, with shipment volumes decreased by one-third. Shein’s weekly US sales dropped roughly by 25% and by October 2025, the number of active consumers also came down. Further tightening came with Executive Order 14259 enforced on April 8, 2025.[xlix] It imposed tariff rates as high as 145% and flat fees of 75 USD-200USD on low-value imports and required all formerly exempt packages to undergo full entry procedures. A global suspension of ‘de minimis exemption’ took effect on August 29,2025, with the Tax Foundation estimating an added annual cost of 10.9 billion USD to consumers, disproportionately affecting lower-income households.

VII. SEC Disclosure Obligations Under 15 U.S.C. § 78m and the De Facto Substitute for Entity Listing

The Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force has kept Shein off the official UFLPA Entity List, but the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has quietly become the best back-door enforcer of forced-labor compliance for any company that wants to sell shares to American investors.[l] The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78m) says that every public company must file an annual Form 10-K that fairly describes all of the risks that could hurt its business.[li] In practice, this means that a company can’t keep investors from knowing that a large part of its inventory could be taken at the border, destroyed, or cause huge fines under Section 307 of the Tariff Act. The SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance made it clear in public statements and comment letters starting in late 2024 that generic boilerplate about ‘supply-chain risk’ is no longer enough. Companies that do business in Xinjiang or the Chinese textile sector must now clearly say whether their goods could be assumed to be made with forced labor under the UFLPA, what steps they have taken to trace cotton back to the farm level, and whether they can actually prove the presumption wrong with clear and convincing evidence. Shein found this out the hard way.[lii] When it first filed for a U.S. initial public offering in late 2023, the SEC wouldn’t let the registration statement go through. Letters sent behind the scenes asked for full information about Xinjiang cotton exposure, suppliers that work with Entity List companies, and the results of independent isotopic testing.[liii] Instead of giving those answers that would have scared investors, Shein pulled its U.S. filing and said in April 2025 that it would instead seek a London listing.[liv] Lawmakers and state officials had already made their sides clear. Twenty-two members of Congress wrote to SEC Chair Gary Gensler in May 2023 and said that no company should be able to list on a U.S. exchange until it writes a letter saying that none of its goods are subject to the UFLPA presumption.[lv]

Three months later, sixteen state attorneys general sent their own letter saying the same thing: no IPO without a clean bill of health for forced labor.[lvi] The House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party and the Congressional-Executive Commission on China kept saying the same thing till now, that either certify compliance or deny the IPO. The SEC’s disclosure rules have become a strong alternative to putting Shein on the Entity List.[lvii] The Department of Homeland Security doesn’t need to do anything. Just the thought of having to tell Wall Street that most of its clothes come from Xinjiang cotton, something that Bloomberg, Oritain, and Applied DNA Sciences have shown over and over again, is enough to keep U.S. capital markets closed. That is a much more immediate and painful result for a company whose entire growth strategy depends on getting billions from public investors than the slow, parcel-by-parcel enforcement at the border. So, even before any court or customs officer decides whether a single Shein dress is allowed, the Securities Exchange Act has put the company under a de facto UFLPA compliance regime. This regime works by being open with investors instead of sending detention notices from CBP.

VIII. Conclusion

The ULFPA says that Shein’s apparels are made with forced labor, at least in part. Independent tests show that the cotton in its clothes comes from Xinjiang over and over again. Some of the companies that supply it are already on the Entity List. Its own audits never go to the cotton fields or spinning mills. If you read the law in a reasonable way, you should be able to see that every low-value package Shein sends to an American doorstep should be stopped at the border. But most of them still get there without any problems.

This paradox exists because three structural realities continue to outweigh the statutory presumption:

The Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force has chosen a narrow, evidence-heavy definition of ‘knowing engagement’ and ‘exporting’. This protects platforms like Shein from being put on the Entity List. Second, until very recently, the de minimis exemption in Section 1321 kept hundreds of millions of Shein packages completely out of the UFLPA’s reach. This made it so that a very small percentage of low-value shipments were held for forced labor. Third, the task force has chosen to focus on upstream producers like gins, spinners, and state-owned farms. This is because blocking tainted cotton at the source disrupts entire supply chains all at once, while chasing millions of individual envelopes would be too much for Customs and Border Protection to handle. Executive orders issued in 2025 have begun to shut the de minimis door, and SEC disclosure rules now make it impossible for any U.S.-listed company to avoid confronting Xinjiang-related risks. The Import Security and Fairness Act which is still moving forward, would finish the job by permanently ending the exemption for non-market economies and requiring every package to identify its manufacturer. However, the century-old conflict between Section 1307’s total ban on forced-labor goods and Section 1321’s push to low-value trade is still not resolved. Congress can fix the problem in one fell swoop by passing the Import Security and Fairness Act, changing the legal definition of “exporting” to include facilitation, and adding Shein itself to the Entity List. Until that happens, every Shein package that gets to an American customer is legally assumed to have been made with forced labor. Every successful delivery shows how far practice still lags behind the law.

References

[i] ‘UFLPA Entity List’ (Homeland Security) <https://www.dhs.gov/uflpa-entity-list> accessed 24 November 2025.

[ii] ‘Department of Homeland Security Adds 29 Entities to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Entity List’ (Office of the United States Trade Representative, 22 November 2024) <https://tinyurl.com/7v52rutm > accessed 24 November 2025.

[iii] ‘Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force Release of the 2025 Update to the UFLPA Strategy’ (Office of the United States Trade Representative) <https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2025/august/forced-labor-enforcement-task-force-release-2025-update-uflpa-strategy> accessed 24 November 2025.

[iv] ‘Shein Eyes US$2 Billion Profit in 2025 despite Trump Tariffs and French Ban’ (South China Morning Post) <https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3331855/shein-eyes-us2-billion-profit-2025-despite-trump-tariffs-and-french-ban> accessed 24 November 2025;  ‘Shein’ (Sacra Research) <https://sacra.com/c/shein/> accessed 24 November 2025.

[v] Margaret Sutherlin, ‘Shein’s Cotton Tied to Xinjiang—Where China Is Accused of Forced Labor’ (Bloomberg, 21 November 2022) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2022-11-21/shein-s-cotton-tied-to-xinjiang-where-china-is-accused-of-forced-labor> accessed 24 November 2025.

[vi] ‘How Many Packages Are Sent under the de Minimis Rule?’ (Red Stag) <https://redstagfulfillment.com/how-many-packages-are-sent-under-de-minimis/> accessed 24 November 2025.

[vii] ‘Trump Administration Fights for America’s Economic and National Security, Designating New Chinese Industry Sectors as High-Priority for Enforcement under the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act’ (Homeland Security, 19 August 2025) <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/08/19/trump-administration-fights-americas-economic-and-national-security-designating-new> accessed 24 November 2025.

[viii] Laura T. Murphy and Charlotte Tate, ‘Assessing the Impact of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act After Three Years’ (Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 29 August 2025) <https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessing-impact-uyghur-forced-labor-prevention-act-after-three-years> accessed 24 November 2025.

[ix] ‘Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force Release of the 2025 Update to the UFLPA Strategy’ (Office of the United States Trade Representative, 19 August 2025) <https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2025/august/forced-labor-enforcement-task-force-release-2025-update-uflpa-strategy> accessed 24 November 2025;  [ix] ‘Presidential Actions: Suspending Duty-Free De Minimis Treatment For All Countries’ (The White House, 30 July 2025) <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/07/suspending-duty-free-de-minimis-treatment-for-all-countries/> accessed 24 November 2025.

[x] Christopher A.  Casey, Cathleen D Cimino-Isaacs, and Michael A. Weber, ‘Section 307 and Imports Produced by Forced Labor’ (Congress.Gov, 2024) <https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11360> accessed 24 November 2025.

[xi] Michael H. Burchett, ‘Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act of 1930’ (EBSCO, 2022) <https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/hawley-smoot-tariff-act-1930> accessed 24 November 2025.

[xii] Matthew M. Higgins, ‘Closed Loophole, Open Ports: Section 307 of the Tariff Act and the Ongoing Importation of Goods Made Using Forced Labor’ (2023) 75 Stanford Law Review 919, 974.

[xiii] ‘China: US Law Against Uyghur Forced Labor Takes Effect’ (Human Rights Watch) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/20/china-us-law-against-uyghur-forced-labor-takes-effect> accessed 24 November 2025.

[xiv] ‘Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) Fact Sheet’ (U.S. Department of State) <https://www.state.gov/office-to-monitor-and-combat-trafficking-in-persons/releases/2025/01/uyghur-forced-labor-prevention-act-uflpa-fact-sheet> accessed 24 November 2025.

[xv] ibid.

[xvi] Sheridan Prasso, ‘Shein’s Cotton Tied to Chinese Region Accused of Forced Labor’ (Bloomberg) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2022-11-21/shein-s-cotton-clothes-tied-to-xinjiang-china-region-accused-of-forced-labor> accessed 24 November 2025.

[xvii] Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act 2021, Pub L No 117-78, § 3(a), 22 USC § 6903(a) (2022).

[xviii] ‘US Adds 29 Chinese Firms to Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Entity List’ (The Print) <https://theprint.in/world/us-adds-29-chinese-firms-to-uyghur-forced-labor-prevention-act-entity-list/2370473/> accessed 24 November 2025.

[xix] Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act 2021, Pub L No 117-78, § 2(d)(2)(B), 22 USC § 6901.

[xx] Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act 2021, Pub L No 117-78, § 2(d)(2)(B)(i)–(v), 135 Stat 1525, 1527–1528.

[xxi] ‘Notice Regarding the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Entity List’ (Federal Register) <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/15/2025-00901/notice-regarding-the-uyghur-forced-labor-prevention-act-entity-list> accessed 24 November 2025.

[xxii] ‘UFLPA Entity List’ (n 1).

[xxiii] ‘Strategy to Prevent the Importation of Goods Mined, Produced, or Manufactured with Forced Labor in the People’s Republic of China’ (Homeland Security: Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans 2022).

[xxiv] ‘Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) Fact Sheet’ (n 14).

[xxv] ‘Presidential Actions: Suspending Duty-Free De Minimis Treatment for All Countries’ (n 9).

[xxvi] Christopher A. Casey, ‘Imports and the Section 321 (De Minimis) Exemption: Origins, Evolution, and Use’ <https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48380> accessed 26 November 2025.

[xxvii] ‘De Minimis Value Increases to $800’ (U.S. Customs and Border Protection) <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/de-minimis-value-increases-800> accessed 26 November 2025.

[xxviii] David S. Johanson and others, ‘Economic Impact of Section 232 and 301 Tariffs on U.S. Industries’ (United States International Trade Commission Washington, DC) <https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub5405.pdf> accessed 26 November 2025.

[xxix] Stephen Finan, ‘“Clothing” The De Minimis Loophole: The Story of An Exception Swallowing the Rule’ (2024) 76(2) Administrative Law Review 454.

[xxx] Nicholas Kaufman, ‘Shein, Temu, and Chinese E-Commerce: Data Risks, Sourcing Violations, and Trade Loopholes’ (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission) <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2023-04/Issue_Brief-Shein_Temu_and_Chinese_E-Commerce.pdf> accessed 26 November 2025.

[xxxi] ‘Fast Fashion and the Uyghur Genocide: Interim Findings’ (Select Committee on the CCP) <https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/fast-fashion-and-the-uyghur-genocide-interim-findings.pdf> accessed 26 November 2025.

[xxxii] ‘2024 UFLPA Strategy Update: Forced Labor in the XUAR Remains Top Concern for U.S. Government’ (Crowell) <https://www.crowell.com/en/insights/client-alerts/the-month-in-international-trade-july-2024#ITB02> accessed 26 November 2025.

[xxxiii] ‘Presidential Actions: Suspending Duty-Free De Minimis Treatment for All Countries’ (n 9).

[xxxiv] ‘Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) Fact Sheet’ (n 14).

[xxxv] Shawn Harwood and others, ‘Forced Labor Update & Analysis – Fresh Names for the UFLPA Entity List’ (Global Supply Chain Law Blog) <https://www.globalsupplychainlawblog.com/supply-chain/forced-labor-update-analysis-fresh-names-for-the-uflpa-entity-list/> accessed 26 November 2025.

[xxxvi] ‘Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force Release of the 2025 Update to the UFLPA Strategy’ (Office of the United States Trade Representative) <https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2025/august/forced-labor-enforcement-task-force-release-2025-update-uflpa-strategy> accessed 26 November 2025.

[xxxvii] Michael R. Littenberg and Samantha Elliott, ‘U.S. Department of Homeland Security Releases Updated UFLPA Strategy’ (Ropes & Gray) <https://www.ropesgray.com/en/insights/viewpoints/102jcif/u-s-department-of-homeland-security-releases-updated-uflpa-strategy> accessed 26 November 2025.

[xxxviii] Laura Bicker, ‘The Truth behind Your $12 Dress: Inside the Chinese Factories Fuelling Shein’s Success’ (BBC) <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdrylgvr77jo> accessed 26 November 2025.

[xxxix] ‘Fast Fashion and the Uyghur Genocide: Interim Findings’ (n 31).

[xl] Michael Race, ‘Shein Lawyer Refuses to Say If It Uses Chinese Cotton’ (BBC) <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clyg7n1d85go> accessed 26 November 2025.

[xli] Michael R. Littenberg and Samantha Elliott (n 37).

[xlii] ‘US Adds 29 Chinese Firms to Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Entity List’ (n 18).

[xliii] Shawn Harwood and others (n 35).

[xliv] ‘Bipartisan Group of Lawmakers Seeks Answers from Administration About Enforcement of Forced Labor Legislation’ (Congressional Executive Commission on China) <https://www.cecc.gov/media-center/press-releases/bipartisan-group-of-lawmakers-seeks-answers-from-administration-about> accessed 26 November 2025.

[xlv] Congress of the United States, Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, ‘Letter to Alejandro Mayorkas Secretary U.S. Department of Homeland Security Washington, DC’ <https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/1-19-24-dhs-letter-on-uflpa.pdf> accessed 26 November 2025.

[xlvi] Stephen Finan (n 29).

[xlvii] ‘Imposing Duties to Address the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China’ (The White House) <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/imposing-duties-to-address-the-synthetic-opioid-supply-chain-in-the-peoples-republic-of-china/> accessed 26 November 2025.

[xlviii] ‘Further Amendment to Duties Addressing the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China as Applied to Low-Value Imports’ (The White House) <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/further-amendment-to-duties-addressing-the-synthetic-opioid-supply-chain-in-the-peoples-republic-of-china-as-applied-to-low-value-imports/> accessed 26 November 2025.

[xlix] Bloomberg, ‘Shein’s Robust US Growth Evaporates After Trump Tariff Hit’ (The Business Of Fashion) <https://www.businessoffashion.com/news/retail/sheins-robust-us-growth-evaporates-after-trump-tariff-hit/> accessed 26 November 2025.

[l] Aaron Nicodemus, ‘Lawmakers Pressure SEC to Examine Shein’s Sourcing Practices before IPO’ (Compliance Week, 2023) <https://www.complianceweek.com/supply-chain/lawmakers-pressure-sec-to-examine-sheins-sourcing-practices-before-ipo/33026.article> accessed 26 November 2025.

[li] ‘Securities Exchange Act of 1934’ (Legal information Institute, Cornell Law School) <https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/securities_exchange_act_of_1934> accessed 26 November 2025.

[lii] ‘Sample Letter to Companies Regarding China-Specific Disclosures’ (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) <https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/staff-guidance/disclosure-guidance/sample-letter-companies-regarding-china> accessed 26 November 2025.

[liii] Lauren Hirsch and Jordyn Holman, ‘Shein, the Fast-Fashion Giant, Is Said to Have Filed for an I.P.O.’ (The New York Times) <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/27/business/shein-ipo.html> accessed 26 November 2025.

[liv] ‘Shein’s Pursuit of an IPO: From New York to London to Hong Kong’ (Reuters, 2025) <https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/sheins-pursuit-an-ipo-new-york-london-hong-kong-2025-05-28/> accessed 26 November 2025.

[lv] Aaron Nicodemus (n 50).

[lvi] Gabrielle Fonrouge, ‘State Officials Want Shein to Prove It Doesn’t Use Forced Labor before It Goes Public’ (CNBC) <https://www.cnbc.com/2023/08/30/shein-faces-scrutiny-over-forced-labor-before-ipo.html> accessed 26 November 2025.

[lvii] Aaron Nicodemus (n 50).

Author: Saumya Verma